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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a formal notion of partial compliance,
called ATTACK-RESISTANCE, of a computer program running to-
gether with a defense mechanism w.r.t a non-exploitability speci-
fication. In our setting, a program may contain exploitable vulner-
abilities, such as buffer overflows, but appropriate defense mecha-
nisms built into the program or the operating system render such
vulnerabilities hard to exploit by certain attackers, usually relying
on the strength of the randomness of a probabilistic transforma-
tion of the environment or the program and some knowledge on
the attacker’s goals and attack strategy. We are motivated by the
reality that most large-scale programs have vulnerabilities despite
our best efforts to get rid of them. Security researchers have re-
sponded to this state of affairs by coming up with ingenious defense
mechanisms such as address space layout randomization (ASLR)
or instruction set randomization (ISR) that provide some protection
against exploitation. However, implementations of such mecha-
nism have been often shown to be insecure, even against the attacks
they were designed to prevent. By formalizing this notion of attack-
resistance we pave the way towards addressing the questions: “How
do we formally analyze defense mechanisms? Is there a mathemat-
ical way of distinguishing effective defense mechanisms from inef-
fective ones? Can we quantify and show that these defense mecha-
nisms provide formal security guarantees, albeit partial, even in the
presence of exploitable vulnerabilities?”. To illustrate our approach
we discuss under which circumstances ISR implementations com-
ply with the ATTACK-RESISTANCE definition.
1. Introduction
In the last several decades there has been impressive progress in
the development and application of automated software testing [12,
20, 26, 34] and formal verification techniques [13, 18, 19, 21].
Despite these gains, establishing trustworthiness of software sys-
tems remains a notoriously difficult and expensive problem. Scal-
ably guaranteeing 100% compliance of large software systems w.r.t
rich specifications remains an open challenge. In fact, users simply
assume that software systems will never be completely free of se-
curity vulnerabilities, despite our best efforts.
In response to this seeming inevitability of exploitable vulner-
abilities in software, security researchers have proposed ingenious
defense mechanisms (e.g., address space layout randomization ab-
breviated as ASLR [40], randomization for a variety of mem-
ory protection schemes [7], obfuscations [41], program shepherd-
ing [27], use of cryptographic devices [39], and encrypted program
execution [14]) that, under suitable assumptions, make it “prac-
tically difficult” for resource-bounded attackers to exploit certain
class of vulnerabilities even though vulnerabilities such as buffer
overflows are present in the system-under-attack. Many of these
mechanisms are widely used in practice because of their effective-
ness against common attackers. These defense mechanisms are de-
signed to complement traditional approaches such as testing and
formal verification, and provide an additional crucial layer of secu-
rity.
On the other hand, in the past years several attacks have been
published against implementation of many of those defense mech-
anisms: some of these attacks leverage side-channels (i.e. timing
side-channels against ASLR [35] and ISR [38]), while others chal-
lenge the assumptions made on the attacker’s strategy (i.e. by us-
ing ROP or JOP strategies instead of straightforward injections
[10, 32]).
Defense mechanisms distinguish themselves from formal meth-
ods and testing in the following ways: First, they give an “intuitive”
yet practically effective partial guarantee of compliance of a soft-
ware system w.r.t a non-exploitability specification, even though
the system may have vulnerabilities in it. By partial we mean that
a resource-bounded attacker can still launch an attack but the proba-
bility is vanishingly small, under suitable assumptions. By contrast,
the traditional aim of formal verification is a complete guarantee or
establish the absence of vulnerabilities. Testing techniques, on the
other hand, are typically incomplete and provide no guarantees of
compliance of a large software system w.r.t a specification. Sec-
ond, defense mechanisms offer different trade-offs between com-
pleteness and scalability, when compared to testing or formal veri-
fication. For example, appropriate use of defense mechanisms may
lower the burden of establishing security guarantees on software
developers by not requiring them to establish full compliance while
giving some measure of security, at the cost of possibly allowing
certain hard-to-exploit vulnerabilities.
While the inevitability of vulnerabilities in software and the
need for effective defense mechanisms has been forcefully made
by many researchers in the past, and eloquently captured in a re-
cent paper [6], what seems largely missing is a formal characteri-
zation of the security provided by these defenses, and to some ex-
tent, a proof strategy or schema for establishing guarantees. Such
a formal and precise characterization of security, in terms of a par-
tial compliance guarantee, can be a foundational way of reasoning
about and comparing defense mechanisms of all kinds using the
same standard approach, just as in the field of cryptography, no-
tions such as “semantic security” are standard ways of comparing
encryption schemes.
Although in cryptography attackers are usually seen as arbitrary
probabilistic algorithms with a certain number of resources (for in-
stance, number of gates which is polynomial in a security param-
eter), we believe that in the case of vulnerability exploitation and
defense this is currently not possible: new attacker models often
radically challenge the assumptions made by defenders, as illus-
trated by ROP, Blind ROP and JOP attacks [9]. However, we be-
lieve that making those assumptions explicit, and carefully arguing
why certain defense mechanism are secure against explicit attacker
classes would substantially improve the efficacy of defense mecha-
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nisms, allowing defenders to spot subtle implementations or design
errors.
In this paper, building on paradigms from cryptography and pro-
gram analysis, we propose a general and formal definition of partial
compliance, we call ATTACK-RESISTANCE, of a software system
w.r.t a (non-exploitability) specification. The key insight of our for-
mal program analysis approach is that a program p ∈ P together
with its defense mechanisms d ∈ D (written p + d) is ATTACK-
RESISTANT against a well-defined attacker (or attack model) A if
the code and runtime behavior of p+d is resistant to exploitation by
A, and this can be expressed using the complexity-theoretic idea of
negligible success probability from cryptography. Informally, we
say that p + d is ATTACK-RESISTANT to attacker A if the prob-
ability of successfully launching a remote program execution by
the attacker is negligible in a suitable security parameter. Based on
this definition, we propose a formal analysis framework and a re-
search program whose goal is to analyze the efficacy of defense
mechanisms from a variety of contexts. We also discuss building
blocks for a proof strategy that can be useful to show ATTACK-
RESISTANCE in various contexts, and that consists in reducing the
attack probability to the likelihood of guessing a random seed,
which lies at the heart of most defense mechanisms, in analogy
to Kerckhoffs’s principle in cryptography [25].
In sum, we make the following contributions in this “Vision and
Challenges” paper:
Contributions
1. We provide a formal definition of ATTACK-RESISTANCE and
discuss a high-level proof strategy for it.
2. We show the utility of this definition and the proof strategy by
analyzing and comparing different ISR implementations from
the literature.
3. Finally, we suggest that unlike formal verification of arbitrary
programs to establish their non-exploitability (e.g., absence of
overflow vulnerabilities), in some cases it is possible to show
ATTACK-RESISTANCE for a large class of programs by only
paying the cost of formally verifying the defense mechanism
exactly once.
Note that our goal is the quantification of the effectiveness of
probabilistic defenses in a general sense, although in this paper
we focus primarily on defenses for memory safety vulnerability
exploitation. On the one hand, we do not aim to cover all types
of run-time countermeasures to memory safety vulnerabilities, but
only the ones in the probabilistic category as defined by Younan
et al. [43]. On the other hand, our approach can also be used to
analyze probabilistic defense mechanisms beyond memory safety,
such as SQLrand [11], which we plan to do as part of future work.
2. Attacker Model
The adversary or attacker A is defined as a probabilistic algorithm
that has access to a copy of the source code of the program-under-
attack p ∈ P (e.g., a web server) and is aware of all low-level vul-
nerabilities contained by p, such as buffer overflows, format string
vulnerabilities etc. The assumption that the attacker has the source
code of p is realistic, given that binary code and obfuscations that
are not cryptographically-secure can be easily reverse-engineered
by attackers. The attacker is allowed to run any type of program
analysis (static and/or dynamic) within a time bounded by a poly-
nomial over the length of a security parameter (a random seed).
The attacker’s goal is to learn the vulnerabilities in the program p,
construct and launch appropriate exploits.
A has remote access to a machine M on which the vulner-
able program p is running (e.g., a machine running the Apache
Web Server). A can interact with p via a network channel, where
it can send multiple messages and observe their respective out-
put. More precisely A can produce k messages: m1,m2, . . . ,mk,
where mi ∈ I and I is an input message space. Each input mes-
sage is represented by finite bit strings, possibly containing exploits
and payloads.A receives k outputs from p, one for each input mes-
sage: o1, o2, . . . , ok, with oi ∈ O, where O is the output message
space. The adversary encodes a malicious program p′ in each input
message using a probabilistic function that adaptively takes into
account previously received outputs (at most k) e : P × Ok → I .
The attacker is not allowed side-channel access to the runtime of p
(beyond what is leaked through its observations) or physical access
toM. Note that although we leaveA largely unspecified to account
for adaptation to the interaction with p, we assume that some char-
acteristics of the encoding function e are known (for instance that
is tailored for ROP exploit construction, shellcode injection etc.).
In the following we will thus denote the adversary as Ae.
Note that if this function is completely unknown, it will be prac-
tically impossible to show ATTACK-RESISTANCE of a particular
defense mechanism, since new attack techniques can easily inval-
idate certain defense assumptions (as shown by ROP and recently
by blind ROP [9]).
If p contains a buffer overflow vulnerability, it allows uploading
the payload into a part of p’s process memory. If the exploit is
successful it leads the control flow of p to the payload causing
it to execute, thus resulting in a control-hijack attack (for further
reading, we refer to the rich literature already out there on buffer
overflow attacks in C/C++ programs [17, 32]).
Formally, the attackerAe wants to remotely execute a malicious
program of his choice p′ ∈ S ⊂ P on a victim machine M. We
define P to be the set of all programs expressed as machine code
runnable onM (for instance x86 machine code), and S is a subset of
P , containing malicious programs that are the target of the attacker
and not containing p. We leave S unspecified and strictly smaller
than P for two reasons: on the one hand, it does not make sense that
S contains p, since this program is being executed on M anyway,
on the other hand the notion of malicious can vary from context to
context (there are many programs that are harmless if injected).
To more precisely define the goal of the attacker we consider
the following event:
E(p, p′,Ae) = { p′ runs in process p after interaction with Ae }
By p′ runs in process p we mean that there is a sequence of
assembly instructions executed in the process memory of p that is
semantically equivalent to p′. Note that without loss of generality
we can assume that for all p′ ∈ S, S contains all programs
semantically equivalent to p′.
3. Attack Resistance
In this Section we define the notion of ATTACK-RESISTANCE more
formally.
Definition 1 We say a defense mechanism d(n) ∈ D, n ∈ N
provides attack resistance for a class of victim program C running
on a machine M against an attacker Ae and a set of malicious
programs S if and only if:
∀ p ∈ C ∀ p′ ∈ S Pr[E(p+ d, p′,Ae)] ≤ (n),
where  is a negligible function on n.
Clearly C excludes program whose vulnerability free version
allow users to execute programs in S (for instance interpreters).
However we leave this class of programs unspecified, since in
general it will depend on the defense mechanism and the attacker
model considered.
We give a few intuitive examples here and a detailed example in
Section 4:
• If e is simple code injection (appending malicious code to a
message that overwrites a buffer) then some implementantions
of ISR [23] provide attack resistance for programs p that do
not leak the seed. We will elaborate about this example in the
following section.
• If e is ROP, then simple ASLR does not provide attack resis-
tance for many programs, whereas advanced ASLR (where the
base address of p is also randomized) or advanced ISR [29] do.
• If e is blind ROP [9] and k is small (or it is not allowed to
restart the program enough times by the same attacker), then
common ASLR provides attack resistance against a large class
of programs, otherwise it does not.
3.1 Proof Strategy for Establishing Attack Resistance
Note that in practice most defense mechanisms against memory
management exploitability rely on the randomness of a certain run-
time transformation. Ideally this randomness should guarantee se-
curity and not the complexity of the transformations induced by the
defense mechanisms, similarly as secret keys are the security cor-
nerstone of cryptographic guarantees as suggested by Kerckhoffs’s
principle [25] or Shannon’s maxim [36].
Therefore, a strategy for establishing ATTACK-RESISTANCE is
to prove that the following sufficient conditions hold for a program
p ∈ C and the defense mechanism d, under the attacker model A:
1. Runtime Secret Seed: A condition for the efficacy of defense
mechanisms is the existence of bit sequence s, |s| ∈ O(n)
called Runtime Secret Seed in the pair p + d of program and
defense mechanism. Note that if the transformation induced by
the defense mechanism is not probabilistic, then an attacker
could eventually reverse engineer it.
2. Resistance guaranteed by keeping the seed secret: A further
condition is a Lemma relating the attack event (remotely ex-
ecuting a malicious program) with the probability of guessing
the random seed s. In other words, to show that for each p′ ∈ S,
Pr[E(p+ d, p′,Ae)] ≤ α · Pr[{Ae guesses s}]
for some constant α.
3. Bounding the Attacker’s probability of guessing s: A useful
formal notion to measure the attacker’s knowledge is to con-
sider the entropy of s. A further condition for the efficacy of the
defense mechanism d is thus that the attacker’s a priori knowl-
edge of s must be low, i.e., the a priori entropy of s is high, and
that it remains high after static and dynamic analysis of p + d.
This notion can be formally captured for instance by quantify-
ing maximal leakage [37], seen as the difference between the a
priori and posteriori entropy of s after program analysis and in-
teraction with the victim machine. This condition is important
since weak defense mechanisms could have a poor key gener-
ation algorithm or some other vulnerability that decreases the
ideal (maximal) entropy of the key. In other words to show is
that the Pr[{Ae guesses s}] ≤ (n) for instance by computing
the maximal leakage of s on the network channel (defined as
the difference of the entropy of s before executing p and after
code analysis and observing the k output messages).
In the following section we will discuss some variants of ISR
from the point of view of ATTACK-RESISTANCE.
4. Attack-resistance of ISR
In the following we discuss and analyze ISR as proposed in [24],
which is supposed to be resistant against code-injection attacks.
In code-injection attacks a sequence of machine code instructions
are written to the stack- or heap-memory of a running process by
exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability. Additionally, the attacker
must overwrite the return address on the current stack frame, using
a value that points to the beginning of the injected code. After the
current function ends its execution, the overwritten return address
is loaded in the instruction pointer register and starts executing the
injected code.
Figure 1. ISR run-time instruction decoding before execution.
The idea behind ISR (illustrated in Figure 1) is to encode the
original instructions of a program using a random key and decode
them during runtime, right before execution of each instruction.
Both RISC (e.g. ARM) and CISC (e.g. Intel x86) architectures use
machine code instructions consisting of opcodes followed by zero
or more operands. Encoding using a random key maps the values of
opcode and operands to a set unknown to a remote attacker which
does not have access to the key. Therefore, if the attacker does
not guess the correct key, the injected code will be “decoded” be-
fore execution to a different value than intended. Depending on the
number of possible instructions for that architecture, their length
and the length of the key, the program will either crash or exe-
cute a different instruction than intended. We will argue about the
probability of each of these outcomes in the following paragraphs.
However, since there have been several attacks on ISR [38, 42],
which are enabled by the existence of 1 and 2 byte instructions on
CISC architectures such as Intel x86, we will assume only 32-bit
RISC architectures in the following paragraphs. Moreover, Table 1
shows a broader overview of the previously mentioned attacks (first
row) and the assumptions they rely on (first column). We give a few
countermeasures on the right-most column which disable the at-
tacks. In the following we will use a combination of some of these
countermeasures to build a defense which is ATTACK-RESISTANCE
against code-injection attacks.
ISR with XOR-ing in ECB mode: Consider a hardware imple-
mentation of ISR using a fixed length n-bit key (stored per process
in kernel space), which changes on each process start-up. Further-
more, assume that the Decoder in Figure 1 is a n-bit XOR gate
implemented in hardware. Let IS the instruction set for a given
RISC architecture. Let |IS| = 2l. Let n be the size in bits of an in-
struction. Now assume that adversary encodes a program p′ using
e. Irrespective of his encoding strategy, the first instruction i1 of p′
must be such that i1 ∈ IS, otherwise the program will crash. If the
key s is chosen uniformly at random, and has not been leaked:
Pr[{i1 ∈ IS}] ≤ 1
2n−l
.
because XORing with a random value is basically a random
permutation in the set of possible instructions. Since l is costant
for a given architecture, this function is negligible in n.
For example, the 32-bit ARM architecture has an instruction
set consisting of under 27 instructions. Therefore in this case we
obtain that the probability that an injected instruction is in IS is
less or equal to 1
225
. Otherwise, the program will crash and will use
a different key upon restart, provided there is no leakage on the key.
Assumptions (down) \Attacks (right)
Return
attack
[38]
Jump
attack
[38]
Direct
key ex-
traction
[42]
Known
plain-
text
attack
[42]
Chosen
key
attack
[42]
Key
guess-
ing
attack
[42]
Countermeasures
Attacker knows address where code is
inserted
× × ASLR
Same key used after crash and restart × × × Change key upon crash
Encoded instruction and decoded
instruction pair give the key (e.g. XOR
is used for de-/en-coding)
× × × × Use bit transposition
Attacker can distinguish 2 behaviors
(e.g. crashed and not crashed)
× × ×
Attacker can distinguish server activity
between guessed return instruction and
first instruction that would cause the
program to crash
×
Attacker can produces infinite loops on
the target program
×
Key location is fixed and in program
accessible user-space memory
× Make key location
unaccessible via user-
space program
Format string or buffer overflow
vulnerability that displays string to
end-user
× × Secure Multi-
Execution
Knowledge of the binary executable
code (this is the plaintext). It could
also be a library if that library is ISR-
ed
× Secure Multi-
Execution
Key(-generator) of ISR mechanism
can be replaced via remote attack (e.g.
ret-to-libc)
× Make key location
unaccessible via user-
space program
Table 1. ISR Attacks versus Assumptions and Countermeasures
Preventing leakage: In the event that the program does not crash
and the key is wrong, the program will execute some instruction
from IS. To avoid that this information or another vulnerability
in the program leaks the key such as in direct key extraction and
known-plaintext key extraction presented in [42], we propose to
combine ISR with secure multi-execution (SME) [16]. In this case,
we SME to run two copies of the program in parallel, each random-
ized with a different key. Both programs receive the same input,
however, before outputting anything the SME mechanism checks if
the outputs of the two program copies are equal. If so, it forwards
the output, otherwise the output is blocked. Under the assumption
that the behavior of the program is deterministic, SME guarantees
that any of the two keys will not be leaked. Thus, after proving
absence of leakage of the key, we can conclude:
Pr[E(p+ d, p′,Ae)] ≤ Pr[{i1 ∈ IS}] ≤ 1
2n−l
≤ α · (n).
for α = 2l and (n) = 1
2n
.
ISR with a Stream-cipher: An alternative way to implement ISR
is, instead of XOR-ing each instruction in the program with the
same key, to use a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) with
a large periodicity, seeded by our n-bit key in order to decode the
programs with a stream-cipher. In this case, the length of an instruc-
tion is independent of the size of the key, and therefore we denote it
with n′. If the malicious program p, which the adversary wants to
inject consists of j instructions [i1, i2, · · · , ij ], a successful attack
requires either guessing j × n′-bits or the n bits of the key. There-
fore, the probability that the program does not crash and chooses
another random key is:
Pr[{i1, i2, · · · , ij ∈ IS}] ≤ 1
2min(j(n′−l),n)
,
which is far less than Pr[{i1 ∈ IS}]. The key-guessing attack
presented in [42] shows some examples of the shortest sequences
of instructions that cause damage consist of at least 3 instructions.
Therefore, if we consider the previous example of a 32-bit ARM
architecture and substitute j by 3, we get that the probability of
executing a sequence of injected code consisting of 3 instructions
without crashing the program is equal to 1
275
. Interestingly, in this
case is not sufficient to increase the key (seen as the input to
the PRNG) size to achieve asymptotic better guarantees, but it is
necessary to also increase the size of the instructions.
Increasing the instruction size: Note that the effective security
parameter in ISR is the instruction size. Usually, the instruction size
is determined by the CPU architecture, and therefore to increase it,
one would need tailored hardware. Although it might be unpractical
(from the efficiency perspective) to increase the instruction size
to improve upon the security guarantees, it is possible to achieve
this without modifications in hardware by using virtualization. For
instance, virtualization obfuscation such as the one provided by
Tigress1 allows one to configure the size of the virtualized and
randomized instruction set. However note that as discussed before,
in practice the probability of code injections attacks for ISR on
1 http://tigress.cs.arizona.edu/
RISC (32 bit) based architectures are already vanishingly small,
given guarantees on the absence of key leakage.
Issues with side channels: Under the assumptions that stack-
base address randomization is not employed and that the key is
not changed when restarting a program and Sovarel et al. [38]
use timing side-channels to determine the key value on Intel x86
architectures. Their technique has a success rate of over 95% and
requires less than 1 hour for 4096-byte keys. However, in the
previous paragraphs we have assumed that the key changes on each
program restart, which is enough to thwart this attack.
Partial leakage: Note that the fundamental goal to show ATTACK-
RESISTANCE is that the bounding probability function (n) is neg-
ligible. Therefore, it is possible to allow some leakage on the key,
if it is possible to show that this will not break the negligibility of
the bounding function. This is for instance the case when leakage is
constant, independent of the key size, or when it is logarithmic. In
future work we plan to explore strategies to account for the possi-
bility of side-channels that have such properties. This is important
for efficiency, since for instance resampling a key after every crash
is computationally expensive. However, allowing a limited number
of crashes with the same key will bound the information that an
adversary can gain. For instance, leakage resilient cryptography
has been sucessfully applied to real implementations in the case
of side-channels caused by CPU caches [5]. Alternatively, bounds
on the leakage could be obtained by leveraging on quantitative
estimations on implementations using techinques such as [28].
Other attacker models: Note that so far we have focused on
common injection attacks. As we have discussed before, ISR to-
gether with secure multi-execution, is not resistant against other
attack strategies such as ROP [32] attacks. ROP attacks do not in-
ject code in process memory, instead they inject addresses of gad-
gets, which are not affected by the simple ISR implementation so
far. However, to make the program ATTACK-RESISTANCE against
ROP, it is possible to extend ISR with defense mechanisms such
as kBouncer [30], ASLR (randomizing the program base address),
or other mechanisms that invalidate ROP (such as hardware imple-
mentations of ISR [29]). However it is not trivial to show that the
combination of this strategies provide ATTACK-RESISTANCE: they
might use different seeds (of different sizes) to achieve random-
ness on their own and they might introduce new side-channels or
attack vectors. Moreover reasoning about attacks such as ROP is
more challenging, since it involves reasoning about the probability
that a randomized injected address does not hit a gadget, which will
strongly depend on the particular layout of the memory at the time
of attack. In the future we plan to analyze this issues more care-
fully, and to show ATTACK-RESISTANCE of this mechanisms under
certain assumptions.
5. Threats to Validity of the Research Program
Practical Value of The Proposed Formal Analysis Framework,
and its difference with respect to traditional formal verification:
The proposed analysis framework essentially establishes that cryp-
tographic primitives used by the defense mechanism d prevent ex-
ploitation by certain attackers, and that the runtime information-
flow leakage technique used by d guarantees a bounded leakage of
secret bits. This is a one time cost of analyzing d for a large class C
of programs that can be accomplished by using appropriate formal
verification techniques, but leaves open that possibility that other
attackers can effectively exploit the program. By contrast, in tradi-
tional formal verification approaches, we have to prove that every
program p is completely free of memory safety vulnerabilities, if
our goal is a 100% guarantee that p adheres to a non-exploitability
specification.
Model-checking is PSPACE-Hard: Model-checking a safety
property is known to be PSPACE-Hard and so then exploit-
construction should be equally hard (in general undecidable) from
a complexity-theoretic point of view. In what way are the guaran-
tees being proposed here any stronger? Observe that we are not
saying anything about the general exploit-construction problem,
and instead focus on analysis of a parametric class of programs
protected by a defense mechanism. The PSPACE-Hardness result
is general, and doesn’t say anything about the hardness of exploit-
ing a given program. We are proposing that given a parametric
class of programs, certain defense mechanisms can make it harder
to exploit and this guarantee of hardness is captured precisely using
the notion of ATTACK-RESISTANCE.
The Defense Mechanisms considered are Useful only for Memory
Errors: The complex software ecosystem of today is subject to
all manner of attacks, not only buffer-overflow attacks. Hence,
it pays to formally analyze defense mechanisms and distinguish
effective ones from the rest. The idea of ATTACK-RESISTANCE can
be used to analyze any defense mechanism that relies on proper
implementation and use of cryptography and guarantees against
remote execution of malicious code, such as SQLrand [11].
Some Defense Mechanisms Shift Attacks on Integrity and/or
Confidentiality to Attacks on Availability: We have assumed that
d detects and prevents all attacks against p. However, in practice it
is often the case that an attack is “detected” by a crash of p, which
prevents an attacker from taking over the control-flow of p. This is
the case for defense mechanisms such as PointGuard or its variant
we present here. The threat to validity is that ATTACK-RESISTANCE
refers to integrity and/or confidentiality attacks, but not availability.
Guaranteeing the absence of leakage is hard: Depending on the
precise details of a defense mechanism, it can be in general harder
to guarantee the absence of leakages (non-interference of the secret
random see w.r.t. public outputs) than show the absence of BOFs,
since non-interference is not a safety property, i.e., is a 1-hyper-
safety property. Moreover, there is the side-channel issue discussed
before: in general to guarantee the absence of certain side-channels,
there is a performance penalty to be paid (such as shutting down
CPU caches, constant time cryptography etc.).
6. Related Work
There is extensive use of formal methods in the security context, es-
pecially for protocol analysis [15]. There is also considerable prior
work on dynamic information flow leakage [33], and on analysis of
implementation of cryptographic primitives [3]. Our work is differ-
ent in that we propose the combination of such analyses to formally
establish the effectiveness of defense mechanisms with respect to
clearly specified attackers.
Pucella and Schneider [31] have also formally investigated the
effectiveness of randomized defenses in the context of memory
safety. Their main result is to characterize such defenses as to be
probabilistically equivalent to a strong typing which would guaran-
tee memory safety for buffers, thus reducing the security of the
defense mechanism to the strength of strong typing. In particu-
lar, they analyze address obfuscation [8], a defense mechanism
against memory corruption attacks, that uses a secret key to ran-
domize the offsets of code and data in heap memory. Their idea is
to treat address obfuscation as a probabilistic type checker, which
has a certain probability p of crashing the program when a buffer
overflow occurs. Differently from our discussion on the ATTACK-
RESISTANCE of ISR against code-injection attacks in Section 4, by
relating to a type checker that catches out of bound access, they
automatically consider a wider range of possible attacks. However,
also due to this abstract charachterization, they acknowledge the
difficulty on computing the probability of a successful attack, as
we propose to do. We believe that different from [31], the ATTACK-
RESISTANCE framework proposed in this work can also be used to
compute the probability of a successful buffer overflow against ad-
dress obfuscation if we combine this defense technique with other
techniques, such as SME or quantitative information flow analysis,
that prevent substantial leakage of the secret key.
Abadi and Plotkin [1] also formally investigate the effective-
ness of memory layout randomization in programming language
terms. Specifically, they consider layout randomization as part of
the low-level implementation of a high-level language. This im-
plementation is analyzed by “mapping low-level attacks against it
to context in the high-level programming language” [1]. Their re-
sults are phrased as full abstraction theorems that say that “two
programs are equivalent in the high-level language if and only if
their translations are equivalent (in a probabilistic sense) in the low-
level language. The equivalences capture indistinguishability in the
presence of an arbitrary attacker, represented as the context of the
programs” [1]. These equivalences are powerful enough to express
both secrecy and integrity properties. Jagadeesan et al. [22], ex-
tend the work of Abadi and Plotkin by considering return-to-libc
attacks as well as dynamic memory allocation features in program-
ming languages. While these are very powerful results, they are
less general than our approach because we consider a wider variety
of defense mechanisms and attacks, and do not fix the program-
ming language. By contrast, the results of [1, 22] are restricted to
ASLR. On the other hand, if a programmer were to write their pro-
grams in the high-level language of [1, 22], then they would get
the protection of ASLR for free without having to explicitly prove
them. In our setting, someone has to prove for a given class of
programs, that the defense mechanism is effective for that class.
Agten et al. [2] describe a compiler that implements full abstrac-
tion, i.e., the compiler guarantees that standard security features in
languages such as Java (e.g., private field) are compiled correctly
down to the lower-level language and the security at the low-level
is enforced via fine-grained access control. This work is orthogonal
to ours since, unlike our approach, they don’t analyze probabilistic
defense mechanisms.
Sovarel et al. [38] and Weiss et al. [42] also perform an analysis
of the attacks against ISR presented in Table 1. They compute
the probability of a successful code-injection attack on a program
protected by the ISR mechanism presented in [4]. Differently from
our analysis they only give numeric values for these attacks on Intel
x86 architectures under additional assumptions, without offering a
more general overview of this probability in terms of the size of the
key and the size of the instruction set and instruction sizes.
Shacham et al. [35] presented a study regarding the assessment
of randomization based software defenses. Their study consisted
of a concrete attack on any program containing a buffer overflow
vulnerability protected by ASLR [40]. Their attacker model was
similar to our in the sense that the attacker had knowledge about the
vulnerabilities in the target program and only had remote access to
the target machine. However, one key factor in their attack was the
assumption that the remote machine is running a certain version
of an Apache server, whose behavior is used as a side-channel.
More specifically, if the correct offset of a libc function is sent
to the Apache server, then it has a different behavior than when
the guess was incorrect. Of course the attack is not dependent on
Apache itself, but on a side-channel which leaks the RSS of ASLR.
This attack is highly effective on 32-bit systems where, ASLR
only randomizes the base address of memory pages which are 4
KBs in size. Therefore, there are only 20-bits of memory which
can be randomized. Brute-forcing a randomization space of this
size is practical on current hardware. Therefore, the straightforward
solution to this attack is to switch to a 64-bit system. In contrast to
[35] we assume that side-channels which leak the RSS do not exist.
7. Conclusion
In conclusion, we have proposed a new notion of partial compliance
that we call ATTACK-RESISTANCE using the notion of negligible
success probability from cryptography. We have also shown that if a
well-defined attacker’s uncertainty of a random seed s remains high
after interaction with p+d, and the only way to attack the system is
by guessing s, then we can say that p + d is ATTACK-RESISTANT,
and that the defense mechanism d is effective. We argue that this
notion can be very helpful in analyzing, and helping design new de-
fense mechanisms. Furthermore, such analysis can be useful in rec-
ognizing design and implementation weaknesses of defense mech-
anisms that are not ATTACK-RESISTANT. As part of future work we
plan to formalize analyze the ATTACK-RESISTANCE of further pop-
ular defense mechanisms and their combinations, to discuss their
strength against common attacker models, and to explore relax-
ations of information flow guarantees (such as quantitative bounds
on entropy reduction), to account for efficient implementations of
defense mechanisms. Moreover, we plan to explore extensions of
our framework to cope with probabilistic defense mechanisms be-
yond memory safety attacks, such as SQLrand [11].
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